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Abstract 
Despite the tendency of the power literature to analyse legitimacy and coercion in separation, 
both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that coercion and legitimacy are not parallel 
lines but can interact in different ways, supporting or undermining each other. A methodical 
exploration of the relationship between legitimacy and coercion is not only important to 
improve the theoretical literatures on power and legitimacy, but also given the increasing 
interest in the power of legitimacy in state- and peacebuilding. This article does three things: 
First, it analyses the overall interaction between coercion and legitimacy. Second, the article 
explores the question that emerges from the interaction analysis; what level of coercion is 
permitted/required in order for a mission’s local legitimacy to be sustained? For the practice 
of peacebuilding the article shows that an operation needs to understand its initial legitimacy 
standing with the local population as that determines how much coercive force it can employ 
without undermining its overall legitimacy.  
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Introduction 
This paper explores the relationship between coercion and legitimacy conceptually and in 
international peacebuilding practice. Both concepts are mechanisms of power according to the 
literatures on power and authority in International Relations and political science (Boulding 
1989; Carr 1939; Tyler 1990; Hurd 2007). Studies that analyse power mechanisms usually 
consider them in separation, either because it conforms to their conceptual view or because it 
facilitates analysis. Therefore, there is a considerable literature on coercion (Koh 1997; 
Young 1979; Levi 1997; Mitchell 1993; Fisher 1981) and on legitimacy (Weber 1978; Tyler 
1990; Hurd 2007; Hurrell 2007; Clark 2005), respectively, and some of these authors consider 
both concepts in their studies. However, these works analyse the concepts separately, rather 
than their mutual relationship. The number of scholarly works which do explore the 
relationship between coercion and legitimacy is very small (Raz 1990; Hurd 2007; Clark 
2005; Tyler 1990; Lake 2010). Very little attention has been paid to this conceptual question, 
and even less to its empirical dimension in peacebuilding. However, the few works named 
above suggest that coercion and legitimacy are not parallel lines but can interact in different 
ways, supporting or undermining each other.  
Hurd suggests that the continued use of coercive power to force an actor to comply 
undermines legitimacy. Others suggest that coercive power is restrained by legitimacy 
(Whalan 2010), which, if taken further, comes to the same conclusion as Hurd; the over-use 
of coercion (whatever that means in practice) undermines legitimacy (Hurd 2007). These 
arguments suggest a negative relationship between coercion and legitimacy, as the former can 
undermine the latter. Turned around, this relationship is often considered mandatory as 
coercion can only be employed by a legitimate institution without being despotic. Lake makes 
the argument that governing a state requires a ruler to hold the monopoly of violence to 
enforce compliance and punish non-compliance, but he must also be recognised as legitimate 
in using this violence (Lake 2010). Similarly, Raz argues that coercive power is required by 
any institution to be considered legitimate at all; a legitimate institution needs to be able to 
enforce its decisions, as a lack of such enforcement itself could become a delegitimising 
factor (Raz 1990).  
A methodical exploration of the relationship between legitimacy and coercion is not 
only important to improve the theoretical literatures on power and legitimacy, but also given 
the increasing interest of academic and policy-makers alike in the power of legitimacy in 
state- and peacebuilding (OECD-DAC 2010; DFID 2012; Lemay-Hebert 2013; Mersiades 
2005). As the introduction to this special issue highlights, coercion and legitimacy can be 
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close comrades in war and conflict: military might may serve to legitimise one actor over 
others (including the state), the legitimate use of violence is spread to actors beyond the state, 
or the unrestrained use of coercive power of governments and militias undermines their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population, causing conflict (von Billerbeck and Gippert, this 
issue). In order to be able to categorise and analyse such complex events as found in conflict 
and post-conflict peacebuilding, the conceptual tools need to be sharpened. Furthermore, 
peacebuilding operations are dependent on the support of the local population and elites for 
reaching their reforms aims (Gippert 2016). So while international missions constitute 
institutions of authority to the local population and elites, they need to be aware how to best 
use the powers they have to achieve their aims (Whalan, this issue). This requires 
understanding how much coercive force they can use without undermining their legitimacy 
standing.  
This article draws its empirical data from two examples of European Union civilian 
crisis management, the EU term for peacebuilding: the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both missions lend themselves to this 
analysis as they have, through different mechanisms, acquired coercive power over local 
actors. However, at the same time the bulk of the missions’ mandates rests on a cooperative 
monitoring, mentoring, and advising approach, which requires the cooperation and voluntary 
compliance of the local police officers and justice personnel. Data on legitimacy perceptions 
was collected through a legitimacy survey and semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 
local police/justice/ministry staff in both countries, which provided for just over 100 
interviews. Legitimacy data for the wider population comes from United Nations 
Development Program surveys. The information on the police reforms is drawn from official 
mission reports, as well as meeting minutes, and official documents on the implementation of 
the reforms. The legitimacy perceptions analysed are those of the local actors at the receiving 
end of EUPM and EULEX’ reforms. 
In exploring the research question of how much coercion an international operation is 
permitted/required to use without undermining its local legitimacy, this article does three 
things: First, it analyses the overall interaction between coercion and legitimacy. It finds four 
categories of interaction in the literature, two of which are explored with the help of empirical 
case studies, as they the only ones which apply to the specific context of international post-
conflict peacebuilding. Second, the analysis of the case studies suggests two findings, which 
seem contradictory at first: 1. that a certain amount of coercion is required for an operation to 
be seen as effective and legitimate; and 2. that too much coercive force breeds resentment and 
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undermines the mission’s legitimacy. Tackling this seeming contradiction, the article finally 
introduces a new conceptual distinction that captures the temporal changes of a mission’s 
local legitimacy – initial legitimacy and action legitimacy. It suggests first, that it is the initial 
level of local legitimacy of the operation that determines how much coercion the mission can 
employ; here initial legitimacy acts as a constraining factor to the degree of coercive force a 
mission can employ (Beetham, 1991). Second, it finds that the lack of effectively using 
coercive force to advance the goals of the mission, undermines the operation’s action 
legitimacy; here effectively wielding coercive force is seen as a requirement for an institution 
to be seen as legitimate (Raz, 1990).  
The analysis of the case studies demonstrates that legitimacy is a dynamic and fluid 
concept, which has the potential to change during a mission’s deployment (Wiharta 2009). 
The two uses of legitimacy (initial legitimacy and action legitimacy) are measures of local 
legitimacy at different times of the deployment, one at the very beginning or before 
deployment (initial legitimacy) and one after the mission has started to work towards its set 
goals (action legitimacy). Both can contain procedural and output legitimacy elements. Initial 
legitimacy of international peacebuilding operations emerges from local interpretations of a 
mission’s official mandate, its statements in the press, or attitudes held towards the 
participating states that second personnel. The information of the mission’s objectives and 
goals in then matched against local communities’ normative benchmarks. The degree of fit 
determines the degree of local legitimacy. Action legitimacy derives its name from the fact 
that it captures local legitimacy attitudes at a later stage of the mission’s deployment, when 
the mission has been working towards its goals and objectives. Action legitimacy is therefore 
based on the match of the actions (or omissions) of the mission (rather than its promises and 
expectations as initial legitimacy is) with the same normative benchmarks of the local 
communities. This conceptual differentiation is inductively derived from the analysis of the 
cases and shows that the argument, is not circular: initial legitimacy influences how much 
coercion the mission is permitted to employ without undermining its legitimacy, while the 
effective use of coercion during the mission’s reform actions influences the mission’s action 
legitimacy. This double finding hence necessitates the double statement of 
‘permitted/required’ in the research question.  
In exploring the relationship between using coercive force and legitimacy and how its 
balance affects an operation’s effectiveness, this article contributes to the second strand of this 
issue that explores the dilemmas of legitimation strategies.  
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Mechanisms of Power 
This paper explores the relationship between coercion and legitimacy, which are both 
mechanisms of power (Hurd 1999; Boulding 1989; Carr 1939; Dahl 1957).  The link to power 
is important for this paper as it considers the means which international peacebuilding 
operations have available to implement their reforms. The relationship between the missions 
and the local staff is not an equal one, but one defined by an asymmetric power relationship.  
For the purpose of this article, the mechanisms of power under exploration are labelled 
coercion (the power of sanctions) and legitimacy (the power of appropriateness). This 
discussion brackets the third mechanism, reward-seeking (the power of incentives),i not 
because it is not considered relevant but because the aim is to investigate the relationship 
between coercion and legitimacy specifically. The following sections briefly introduce the 
two power mechanisms, coercion and legitimacy. 
 
Coercion 
Coercive power relies on the threat or application of sanctions or punishment for non-
compliance. The reason for compliance of an actor is fear and is based on an attempt to avoid 
being subject to negative consequences for non-compliant behaviour (Fisher 1981). Coercion 
can work to prevent and to retrospectively punish non-compliance (Young 1979, 5). That 
means coercion can take different forms depending on whether it serves to shift behaviour 
towards compliance (using for instance threats) or whether it is used to punish actors for 
already having acted in a non-compliant manner. Actors’ choices are subject to a rational 
evaluation of what course of action is most beneficial (in the sense of least hurtful). The 
stimulus for action or the choice of behaviour is externally imposed by the institution making 
the compliance demand (Hurd 2007, 38).  
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is described by Weber as a mechanism ‘to influence the conduct of one or more 
others (the ruled) […] in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as 
if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own 
sake’ (Weber 1978, 946). Contrary to coercive power, which requires external control, in the 
case of legitimacy ‘control by others is replaced by self-control, as social norms and values 
are internalized and become part of the individual’s own desires concerning how to behave’ 
(Hoffman 1977, 8). Legitimacy provides a reason for compliance as through the process of 
internalisation the issued rules or laws become part of the individual’s own motivational 
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system. Legitimacy is a social phenomenon that depends on the individual or collective 
interaction between the rule-giver and the rule-recipient. Legitimacy perceptions arise from 
the legitimacy judgements made by an audience on the basis of certain normative 
benchmarks. These benchmarks are individually and collectively held beliefs and legitimacy 
arises out of the match of these benchmarks with the aims and policies of the rule-giver. 
However, at the same time legitimacy also imposes constraints on rule-makers not to exceed 
the limits of their legitimacy. Legitimacy is hence a social and relational process which has 
consequences for both the rule-maker and the rule-recipient - the actor and the organisation – 
it is both a constitutive and a constraining factor (Clark 2005, 4-5).ii  
 
Interactions between coercion and legitimacy 
From the small literature that addresses the relationship between coercion and legitimacy, we 
can identify four main categories of how the concepts interact: 1. Legitimacy constrains the 
use of coercive force; 2. The use of coercion undermines legitimacy; 3. Coercive power is 
required for legitimate authority; 4. Coercive power can over time turn into legitimate power 
(authority). The contributions to this final category analyse historical cases of how nation-
states evolved from the right of the strongest to rule-based entities in which the processes and 
justifications for power became institutionalised and legitimated (Hurd 2007; Hurrell 2007). 
While this is an interesting strand of the argument, it does not apply to the temporally limited 
phenomenon of post-conflict peacebuilding. International peacebuilding operations are very 
particular phenomena as they constitute institutions of authority to the local population and 
elites through the powers of their internationally sanctioned mandates. At the same time, they 
are by definition temporary intrusions on the host state’s sovereignty. These characteristics of 
international peacebuilding operations inherently exclude the final category of interaction, 
which sees coercive power turning into legitimacy over time. That is because no international 
peacebuilding mission is solely based on coercive power (indeed coercive powers are usually 
limited) and is never in the country for long enough to undergo such a transition; they are 
temporary phenomena by definition (Knoll 2007). However, in the wider context of war and 
conflict, there are numerous examples of military leaders who grab power by coercive means, 
like a military coup, and then work to legitimise (through different strategies) their power 
over time. This exclusion leaves us with three categories to explore. 
The first category, legitimacy constrains coercion, is based on the argument that an 
over-use of coercion breeds resentment and undermines legitimacy. This negatively 
influences the degree and quality of compliance that can be secured (Beetham 1991; Hurd 
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1999, 2007). Beetham provides the example of a classroom and a teacher. If the children see 
the teacher as the legitimate authority, based on their shared belief in the value of education, 
the goal of teaching is facilitated by the children’s voluntary compliance (1991, 28). If the 
children buy into the goal of education, they accept that its conveyance may include a degree 
of punitive action for non-compliance that all schools reserve for themselves. However, the 
legitimacy of the teacher only equips him with the use of force that is considered appropriate 
for the conveyance of education. This means that a legitimate authority can use some coercive 
power, but it is limited to reaching an agreed goal (education) and constrained by the degree 
of legitimacy the authority has, as based on the collective normative benchmark (value of 
education). In other words, legitimacy is a prerequisite for using coercive force and its degree 
serves as a constraining factor as to how much coercion can be used. In the following section, 
the example of implementing police reforms in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is used to explore this constraining power of legitimacy on coercive force in an empirical 
context. 
The second category sees coercion and legitimacy as mutually exclusive mechanisms 
of power. Hannah Arendt explains that authority (legitimate use of power) by definition 
precludes the use of coercion, ‘where force is used, authority itself has failed!’ (Arendt 1958, 
2) . Authority for her is based solely on legitimacy and any use of coercive power denotes a 
lack of legitimacy. She specifies, ‘The authoritarian relation between the one who commands 
and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who 
commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy 
both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place’ (Arendt 1958, 2). 
Drummond analyses the work of Etzioni on power and involvement and agrees with Arendt 
that the use of coercion by definition precludes involvement (his variable of voluntary 
compliance) (Drummond 1993, 12). Blau, in his analysis of Weber’s understanding of 
authority, states that coercion and authority are both sources of social control but they are 
incompatible (Blau 1963, 313). Not only can they not work together in achieving their 
common aim, social control, but they are mutually exclusive, ‘its [power’s] use to coerce 
others destroys its potential as a source of authority over them’ (Blau 1963, 313). This 
category does not see legitimacy as a prerequisite for coercion but considers the two concepts 
mutually exclusive. It is unlikely that this applies to international peacebuilding operations, 
which use a range of different power mechanisms simultaneously, as most governance 
institution do.  
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Weber himself is ambiguous on the relationship between coercion and legitimacy; it 
seems to differ between his writings. While Blau asserts in his analysis of Weber’s theory of 
authority that Weber sees legitimate authority and coercion as mutually exclusive (1963, p. 
313), Weber claims in Economy and Society that it is not only possible to develop from 
‘domination based on a position of monopoly’ into domination based on authority but to 
develop ‘into associations with heterocephalous [two-headed] power of command and 
coercive apparatus’ (1978, 946). This account seems to understand authority as based on both 
voluntary obedience and the power to use force. This line of interpretation also seems to 
underpin Weber’s understanding of the state as based on the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force’ (1978, 54), which again marries the two concepts but constrains coercion to having 
to be ‘legitimate’. This interpretation moves Weber into the previously discussed category of 
legitimacy constraining the use of coercive power, but allowing it in the right measure. 
The final category posits that the successful use of coercive force, in order to ensure 
compliance, is a precondition for any legitimate authority (Raz 1990). Raz states, 
‘governments of the kind we are familiar with can only succeed in meeting the conditions of 
legitimacy (according to the service conception) if they have the authority to use and are 
successful in the use of force against those who flout certain of their directives’ (Raz 2010, 
158). Lake argues in a similar fashion that the political authority of a state can and needs to 
use coercive power to ensure stability and order (2008, 15). In his view, the mixture of 
legitimate authority and coercive force enables states to fulfil their end of the social contract. 
The failure of which would dispose the state of its legitimacy. Therefore, the effective use of 
coercion is seen as an important element of legitimate authority. The case of judicial reform in 
Kosovo serves to illustrate this pattern of interaction in more detail.  
Although this analysis has discovered four different perspectives on the relationship 
between coercion and legitimacy in the literatures, only two of them practically apply to post-
conflict peacebuilding. The strand of the literature that considers their relationship to be 
evolutionary with coercion developing into legitimate authority over time, is interesting but 
for the reasons established before does not apply to the following empirical analysis. Arendt’s 
analysis and Blau’s reading of Weber that coercion and legitimacy are by definition mutually 
exclusive also is unlikely to apply to international peacebuilding, which has been known to 
use both if they have the means.  
 The two relevant categories, legitimacy as a constraining factor and coercion as a 
condition for legitimate authority, both pose the question of balancing. An institution needs to 
have sufficient coercive power to be seen as effective but the overuse of coercion can 
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undermine legitimacy. The question that hence arises is what is the right amount of coercion 
to sustain legitimacy? This puzzle is explored in the following section with the help of two 
cases of post-conflict peacebuilding. Using this empirical evidence helps shed light onto the 
question of how much coercion is required or permitted for an international operation’s local 
legitimacy to be sustained.iii This exploratory analysis seeks to lay some initial foundations 
for future research rather than ‘test hypotheses’ in any generalizable form. 
 
Legitimacy and Coercion in International Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding, as understood by the academic and practitioners’ literatures, has been heavily 
influenced by the United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace, which incorporated 
peacebuilding into the UN’s remit of tools for conflict management (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In 
this literature peacebuilding is understood as an effort by the international community of 
states and international organisations to support and build peace in post-conflict countries 
using a host of associative strategies (Paffenholz 2013; Campbell and Peterson 2013; 
Lederach 1997). Originally defined as an activity of the United Nations, regional 
organisations have increasingly become involved in peacebuilding under Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter. This article explores two examples of European Union civilian crisis 
management, the EU term for peacebuilding: the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the 
EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following sections will provide a very brief 
introduction into each operation and the cases of police and justice reform that are analysed 
respectively.  
 
EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina- Community-based policing 
International intervention in Bosnia started during the 1992-1995 war, which pitted the three 
main ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks) against each other after the break-up of 
Yugoslavia (Woodward 1995; Silber and Little 1996). International intervention to end the 
war, in the form of US-led air-strikes against the Serb forces, finally brought all parties to the 
negotiating table in 1995 (Holbrook, 1999). The General Framework Agreement for Peace 
was the basis for a large military presence and an International Police Training Force (IPTF) 
as well as the blueprint for a new state that divided the country along ethnic lines into two 
entities: The Serb-majority Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation (GFAP, 
1995). These entities are the seat of most state power, including the power to police their 
respective territory. To Bosnian-Serbs this division is the requirement for their community to 
live in a majority-Bosniak country and a non-negotiable security guarantee. This highlights 
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the importance of policing to be a power of the entities and not of the central state. To the 
Bosniak population, on the other hand, Bosnia’s division is a reminder of the methods of 
ethnic cleansing used during the war and stands in the way of a unified Bosnian state for 
which policing should be a power of the central state (Mühlmann, 2008). The communities’ 
divisions on the question whether policing should be a power of the central state or the 
entities are key to the communities’ legitimacy views of EUPM. 
The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was deployed in January 2003 to take 
over from IPTF and bring the Bosnian police forces closer to European standards. EUPM was 
not empowered to take executive action but relied on a cooperative mandate to monitor, 
mentor, and inspect the local police. However, in cases of intransigent non-compliance the 
head of EUPM could draw on the power of the Office of the High Commissioneriv (the 
highest power in the state) to fire officers (Merlingen 2009; PPIO 2003). This provided 
EUPM with a coercive edge, particularly in the first years (under analysis here) when the 
local officers had not yet found out the mission’s (and OHR’s) hesitancy to use that power. 
EUPM’s mandate can be divided into two essential parts for this analysis: the first aimed at 
professionalising the local police and strengthening their capacities, while the second foresaw 
strengthening the central state policing institutions, at the expense of the powers of the entities 
(Council of the European Union 2002).  
Considering the match of the communities’ normative benchmarks with the reforms of 
EUPM, the following stands out: All ethnic communities in Bosnia support the 
professionalization of the police as it matches their normative belief that a strong police (of 
their own ethnic group) is important for their community’s security (Mühlmann, 2008; 
Interviews with Bosnian Police officers, 2013). However, the centralisation reforms of EUPM 
are not supported at all by the Serb community, as they contradict their fundamental 
normative belief that policing is an entity right and a required security guarantee (Mühlmann, 
2008; Interviews with Bosnian Police officers, 2013). From the Serb point of view, only one 
part of EUPM’s mandate supports their legitimacy views: professionalization of the local 
police (Interviews with Bosnian Police officers, 2013). This analysis focuses on the first 
mandate period of EUPM from January 2003 until December 2005 and analyses the reform 
that aimed at introducing community-based policing. 
The police in the former Yugoslavia, and hence in Bosnia, was state-oriented, which 
means the police were considered a tool to protect the interest and safety of the state. The 
police was hence an instrument of state control rather than a service to the citizens (Dziedzic 
and Bair 1998). Community policing, on the other hand, envisions the relations between the 
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police and the public to be a partnership in which the needs of the community determine 
policing priorities (Morash and Ford 2002).  One of the core reforms of EUPM was to embed 
community policing in Bosnia’s forces in order to improve the still distrustful relations 
between the public and the police, especially between minority communities and police of 
other ethnic groups (EUPM 2005). This required breaking up the monopoly of control of the 
ministry of interior (MoI) in the respective entities. This process was resisted heavily in the 
Republika Srpska. Resistance took the form of refusal to start the reforms and refusal to 
engage in community policing (EUPM 2004b). 
 The official orders from the RS MoI to start the reform process were produced nearly 
2 years after the reform was meant to have started (EUPM 2004b). The official explanations 
of the MoI in the RS was that community policing ‘did not match the norms and values of the 
Bosnian police’ as it required a degree of institutionalisation that contradicted ‘the cultural 
framework’ of the local police (Interviews with RS ministry of interior, October 2013). The 
MoI officials were very open about the fact that they had resisted the reform because of this 
perceived mismatch. They did not recognise the value of community policing and they saw it 
as an imposition of EUPM and a general Western European norm (Interviews with senior 
officials, RS ministry of interior, October 2013). Speaking to senior police officers outside the 
MoI and several civil society organisations provided an additional explanation for the 
resistance to the community policing reforms. Community policing requires the 
decentralisation of policing power away from the MoI and towards lower ranked police 
officers and the public. This automatically entails a loss of control over the police and with 
that one of the most important tools of state (entity) control. Community policing was seen to 
contribute to the loss of control over the police by the MoI, just like the centralisation 
reforms, and was therefore perceived as illegitimate; it contradicted the fundamental 
normative belief of the RS leadership that control over the police should be an entity right 
(Interviews with local MoI and senior police staff, October 2013). This interpretation of entity 
rights is enshrined in the Dayton Accords and with that in the constitution (GFAP 1995). 
Therefore, EUPM’s reforms threaten the constitutional rights of the entities, a security threat 
to the RS, who, as mentioned above, see the existence of the powerful RS as a security 
guarantee to life in a Bosniak-majority state. This lack of legitimacy of EUPM’ centralisation 
reforms and with it community-policing, led to the resistance of the RS leadership to the 
introduction of community-based policing.  
As legitimacy can lead to voluntary compliance with orders, as the literature above 
explains, the limited degree of legitimacy of EUPM (based only on their goal of 
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professionalising the local police) created an obstacle to Serb compliance with the reform of 
community policing. In order to push this reform through, EUPM decided to use pressure and 
coercive threats (with the support of the OHR) against the MoI and police director of the RS 
(EUPM 2004a). EUPM threatened to use the power of the OHR to remove any police and 
MoI staff from their post who refused to support the community policing reform. These 
threats carried weight as the OHR has the power to fire officers (OHR 2015; GFAP 1995). As 
mentioned above, coercion can be used to prevent or to retrospectively punish non-
compliance. In the case of the RS, EUPM (and the OHR) used coercive threats to change the 
behaviour of the relevant senior RS staff from recalcitrant to compliant in order to launch the 
community policing reform. 
However, by employing these coercive threats, EUPM’s local legitimacy changed. 
EUPM’s initial legitimacy had been limited in the case of the Serb community as they only 
agreed with the reforms aiming at professionalizing the police. Low initial legitimacy does 
not provide much scope for EUPM to use coercion. This showed when EUPM tried to use 
coercion to push through the community policing reform, despite Serb resistance. By doing so 
EUPM undermined their action legitimacy (as based on their actions rather than initial 
perceptions of the mission) as they overstepped the limits of their authority as perceived by 
Serbs.  
The link between the move from initial to action legitimacy and EUPM’s coercive 
stance is visible in the plummeting of Serb approval rates of EUPM between 2003 (50.7%) 
and the end of 2004 (35%), the time period where the mission started to use coercion (UNDP 
2004; UNDP 2003). As these surveys only ask for approval of EUPM, not legitimacy, the 
connection between the two needs to be established. The author’s interviews with RS ministry 
of interior staff and police corroborate the connection between the survey results and EUPM’s 
actions; EUPM’s coercive approach was the reason for the decline in approval rates as their 
clumsy threats had been widely reported and discussed in the media (Interviews with RS 
ministry staff, October 2013).  
This case shows very similar characteristics of the relationship between coercion and 
legitimacy as Beetham’s work introduced above: A legitimate authority can use some 
coercive power to reach agreed on goals but the degree of coercion is determined by its initial 
legitimacy (local legitimacy at the time of deployment, based on expectations towards and 
statements of the mission’s goals and policies). In this case the agreed-on goal was only 
professionalising the Bosnian police as the RS never agreed to EUPM’s centralisation plans. 
The mission overstepped this limit when they pressured the RS leadership into accepting the 
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community policing reforms, undermining their action legitimacy, as indicated by the UNDP 
surveys and the author’s interviews. This analysis provides empirical evidence to Beetham’s 
(and others’) claims that the degree of legitimacy constrains the use of coercive force. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this finding poses the question of how much coercion can 
be used in order to sustain legitimacy.  
 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
After years of effective apartheid, in which the Albanian population of the Serbian province 
of Kosovo was oppressed by the government in Belgrade, the Albanian militia of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army was formed. Their militarised resistance provoked large-scale Serb army 
involvement in Kosovo from 1998 onwards, leading to ethnic cleansing and wide-spread 
violence against the Albanian community (Judah 2002, 2008; King & Mason 2006). NATO 
intervened with air-strikes in March 1999 and Kosovo became an international ward, 
administered by the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as of June 
1999. The international presence was reduced, following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence in 2008. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo was envisioned to take over 
from UNMIK and support Kosovo’s rule of law institutions (Weller 1999). To obtain Serbia’s 
and Russia’s support for the mission, EULEX was deployed as a ‘status neutral’ mission, 
which means it does not officially recognise Kosovo’s independence but continues to regard it 
as an international ward (at least on paper) (de Wet 2006; Muharremi 2010).  
EULEX’ mandate was split between monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA) the 
relevant institutions of the rule of law and a limited executive mandate that allowed 
independent investigation and prosecution of war criminals, organised crime and serious 
financial crime, among others (Council of the European Union, 2008, articles 3 (a &d)). 
EULEX is still operating in Kosovo and has undergone multiple restructuring phases. This 
article focuses on the initial reform work between 2008 and 2012, specifically EULEX’ 
executive judicial work to bring to justice highly connected individuals accused of organised 
crime and corruption.   
EULEX’s mandate was focused on supporting and strengthening the rule of law 
institutions of Kosovo to make them more effective at dealing with past crimes but also to 
build public trust in the rule of law again, which the years of apartheid had undermined for the 
Kosovo-Albanian population. The Albanian populationv strongly supported EULEX’ aims of 
strengthening the rule of law, eradicating judicial impunity for highly-connected individuals 
with ties to organised crime, and tackling high-level corruption. Ordinary Kosovars were 
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highly aware of the short-comings of their own rule of law institutions, especially the 
judiciary (KIPRED 2010a; KIPRED 2010b); In April 2009, less than 20% of all Kosovars 
were satisfied with their courts (UNDP 2009b). EULEX’s strong statements to tackle 
Kosovo’s problems, the mission’s strong mandate, and their purported objectives all resonated 
with the Kosovo Albanian population. The resonance of EULEX’ mandate with the Kosovo-
Albanian population was also demonstrated when their legitimacy views of EULEX increased 
despite the EU’s announcement to deploy EULEX as a ‘status-neutral’ mission that would not 
recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Although after this announcement Kosovo 
Albanian views of EULEX initially plummeted to 13%, they rose again as soon as it became 
clear that EULEX’ mandate was not going to change (UNDP 2008b; Interviews with civil 
society, April 2013). This lead to high approval rates of EULEX in the first year of their 
deployment, peaking at 55% in August 2009 (UNDP 2009a). 
Kosovo’s judiciary had, for the years of oppression, been staffed with Serb judges and 
prosecutors. The limitations for Kosovo-Albanians working in government positions, meant 
that hardly any Albanian prosecutors and judges existed in Kosovo in 1999, after NATO’s 
bombing campaign. Rebuilding of the judiciary never took centre-stage for UNMIK. The low 
quality of local judiciary staff hurried through qualifications or possessing qualifications from 
Yugoslavia pre-Serb oppression (before 1989), meant the judiciary soon became (and 
remains) Kosovo’s Achilles Heel (Strohmeyer 2001; Marshall 2003). EULEX recognised the 
inability of Kosovo’s fledgling judiciary to prosecute and trial highly connected individuals. 
This was due to judges’ fear rather than unwillingness as no adequate protection is in place 
for them, both inside and outside of the court room. The small country and extensive family 
ties make isolating judges for safety difficult. Further, low local salaries paired with rising 
cost of living (thanks to the influx of highly-paid internationals) make local judges vulnerable 
to bribes. Even if they resist bribes, their jobs pay too little to risk their lives for a trial 
(International Crisis Group 2010). EULEX recognised this problem and took over these trials 
in an executive manner, which their mandate permitted.  
This approach was greeted with support by the local population because it matched 
popular beliefs that corrupt but highly-connected people should be prosecuted, while 
providing local judges with the solution to their problem of not feeling safe to trial them 
themselves. The Kosovo public hold a very low image of their own judiciary, with over 40% 
of people believing the court system to be corrupt (UNDP 2009b). Coercion in this instance 
took the form of EULEX judges punishing retrospective non-compliance with Kosovo state 
laws regarding corrupt practices particularly in public tenders (in the case of the minister for 
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transport and other ministry officials) and organised crime. As mentioned above, coercion can 
serve to preventatively shape behaviour into compliance or to retrospective punish non-
compliance. In this case EULEX had the power to do the latter by bringing highly-connected 
individuals to court. Retrospective punishment can, however, also be seen as a future 
prevention of non-compliance by demonstrating the consequences of non-compliance, hence 
making future threats more credible (Young 1979). 
Despite its coercive power to punish law-breakers and the local population’s support, 
EULEX did not achieve very much with regards to these reform aims. By the end of 2010 (2 
years after deployment), the mission had conducted 4 corruption cases and none for high-level 
organised crime (Kosovar Stability Initiative 2010). Several high-level arrests were made, 
including the former minister for transport, but he was acquitted (EULEX Press Release 2010; 
EULEX Press Release 2012). In 2011 and 2012 several further high-level arrests followed, 
but the total number of cases remained low with the mission publicising their every move but 
failing to show effective results (EULEX Press Release 2011a; EULEX Press Release 2011b; 
UNSC 2012). EULEX’ criminal judges handled 87 cases in 2010, up from 56 in 2009. For 
2010 that meant an average of 2.2 cases for each of the 39 EULEX judges per year, an 
improvement from the 1.4 cases per judge in 2009 (EULEX 2010). By the end of 2012, after 
5 years on the ground, EULEX judges had pronounced 308 verdicts in the criminal field 
(KIPRED 2010a) but failed to end or even curb the culture of impunity for highly-connected 
individuals.  
EULEX has had a rollercoaster ride of legitimacy perceptions in Kosovo: its initial 
legitimacy started out very low due to the Albanian disappointment over EULEX’s  status-
neutrality, which ran counter to their normative belief on Kosovo’s independence (UNDP 
2008a; UNDP 2008b). Once the Albanian population realised that this agreement did not 
change EULEX’ mandate and policy direction, support and initial legitimacy rose steeply 
(UNDP 2009a). However, after three years on the ground with very little to show for itself, 
EULEX’ action legitimacy (as based on actions and omissions) declined considerably (UNDP 
2011; UNDP 2012; KIPRED 2013). 
What undermined EULEX’ action legitimacy was the perception that they failed to 
enforce their own aims and set new standards for Kosovo’s rule of law (KIPRED 2013; IPOL 
2011; Saferworld 2012). My interviews further show this link: ‘why are EULEX here when 
they don’t do anything? If they can’t, who can?’ asked me a disillusioned NGO worker. A 
member of a local think tank stated: ‘we had such high hopes. EULEX would help us. We 
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need strong courts but they don’t work. But now, they still don’t work even with EULEX 
here’ (Interviews with civil society, Kosovo, April 2012).   
In terms of the relationship between legitimacy and coercion, this case shows that the 
authority of EULEX was undermined by their lack of effective use of the coercive powers 
they commanded to advance their goals. This case provides empirical evidence to the claim 
Raz makes that a legitimate authority requires an effective command of coercive force (Raz 
1990). Raz and Lake argue that an authority which cannot enforce its decisions against people 
who seek to ‘flout’ them are shown up as ineffective, which undermines their position of 
legitimacy. Lake bases this loss of legitimacy on the failure of the institution to uphold its end 
of the social contract on which its authority is based (2008). In the case of EULEX this 
argument is key, as it was the failure to live up to the reform promises the mission made and 
the population bought into that undermined their legitimacy.  
 
A question of balance 
The empirical analysis has yielded a number of relevant findings. Due to the case study 
approach taken here, these findings cannot be generalized beyond these cases but in their 
limited form still provide important insights. While EUPM’s action legitimacy was 
undermined by the over-use of coercion given its limited initial legitimacy, EULEX’s action 
legitimacy was undermined by the ineffective employment of coercion. The dual findings of 
the case studies hence support the conceptual analysis: Beetham argues that the teacher who 
exceeds the limits of coercive power permitted to convey his lessons for the purpose of 
education loses legitimacy in the eyes of the children – the EUPM case (Beetham 1991); Raz, 
on the other hand, states that governments require coercive force to be considered effective 
and hence legitimate – the EULEX case (Raz 2010). What both the conceptual analysis and 
the case studies demonstrate is that the ‘wrong’ use of coercion can undermine perceptions of 
legitimacy and with that the effectiveness of the mission (see Weigand, this issue). So, what 
level of coercion is required/permitted to sustain an international operation’s legitimacy?  
 The answer to this question emerges from both the conceptual and the empirical 
analysis; the level of coercion an institution can use depends on its initial degree of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the relevant audience. Beetham explains that the level of legitimacy of the 
teacher derives from the children’s belief in the value of education (Beetham 1991, 28). Lake 
states that the legitimacy of an operation comes from the social contract between the mission 
and the local population (or elite) (Lake 2010). Both accounts are illustrations of the process 
of legitimation in which a relevant audience makes judgements as to the validity of these 
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legitimacy claims by matching them to their own normative benchmarks. Normative 
benchmarks of a community therefore constitute a yard-stick against which institutional 
claims for legitimacy are measured. If these claims are accepted because they conform to the 
community’s benchmarks, legitimacy arises. If these claims are rejected, no legitimacy 
perceptions arise. Since legitimacy is a matter of degree, it is also possible for an institution’s 
claims to be partially accepted with anything ranging from low to medium level legitimacy 
perceptions emerging as the case of EUPM showed. 
 Initial perceptions of legitimacy towards international peacebuilding operations 
emerge from local interpretations of a mission’s official mandate, its statements in the press or 
other media, or attitudes held towards the participating states that second personnel. The 
information of the mission’s aims and goals in then matched against local communities’ 
normative benchmarks. The degree of fit determines the degree of initial local legitimacy. 
 This argument implies a causal connection between the levels of coercion used and the 
sustainability of a mission’s legitimacy. A high level of initial legitimacy, as based on the 
match of local normative benchmarks with the mission’s mandate and objectives, permits the 
use of more extensive coercive force. Failure to use such coercive force for the fulfilment of 
the reform considered locally desired undermines the legitimacy standing of the mission. Low 
or partial levels of initial legitimacy, as based on a mismatch or partial match of local 
normative benchmarks with the mission’s mandate and objectives, limits the use of coercive 
force. Exceeding these limits undermines the legitimacy standing of the mission. These two 
statements can be condensed into a two-step process: 
 
 
1. Initial legitimacy of operation -> degree of coercion locally permitted  
2. Using right amount of coercion -> operation’s action legitimacy 
 
This is a counterintuitive process as legitimacy is the independent variable in the first step and 
the depend in the second. However, as noted above, the two legitimacies are conceptually and 
practically different both in terms of being sequential and drawing on different sources. 
Coercion similarly is the product of the first process and the determining variable in the 
second. However, it could also be considered as acting as the intervening variable as it is the 
same coercion in both cases. However, a two-step process makes the sequential nature of the 
processes clearer and helps with its analysis. As these processes were drawn in part from the 
empirical evidence of the two case studies, I cannot test them on the same cases. However, 
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they do serve to illustrate the complex and highly case dependent nature of the relationship 
between legitimacy and coercion in peacebuilding. Future work is needed to see if these 
causal connections are relevant beyond this article and these two case studies. 
In their limited scope, these findings nevertheless have implications for the practice of 
peacebuilding as they suggest that peacebuilding operations need to be aware of their own 
legitimacy standing with the local population because their possibility of using coercive force 
depends on it, i.e. they need to get the balance of coercive force right. Too much coercion can 
entail overstepping legitimacy limits and undermine legitimacy, which breeds resentment and 
resistance like in RS. Too little coercive enforcement of a peacebuilding operation’s rules can 
make otherwise highly legitimate missions seem ineffective as EULEX experienced. It is 
almost impossible to prescribe how much coercion exactly a mission can use in a legitimate 
manner as that is highly context specific as the analysis shows. However, we do know that the 
basis for local legitimacy evaluations are the match of local normative benchmarks and the 
mission’s mandate and objectives. This suggests that in order to achieve a high degree of 
initial local legitimacy, local rationales for reform need to be considered heavily when 
drafting mandates and planning mission objectives. A mission whose mandate and objectives 
are informed by local priorities would stand a better chance of being considered legitimate 
initially than a mission that did not include local priorities, all else being equal. Such 
information on local society’s or different communities’ normative benchmarks can be 
gleaned from planning teams’ consultation with local stakeholders, civil society, and focus 
groups of local citizens in different areas and of different communities. Indeed, the 
Australian-led RAMSI operation in the Solomon Islands incorporated extensive local 
consultations into their mandate which bolstered their local legitimacy (Whalan 2010). 
Given the increased focus of international organisations and sending states on the 
value of local ownership, which should include ownership of the drafting process, 
considerations of local benchmarks fit into the overall picture (even if that picture only exists 
on paper) (see von Billerbeck, this issue). However, such information on local normative 
benchmarks at the moment does not enter into the largely political bargaining process that 
establishes missions’ mandates in the deploying organisation’s headquarters. Further, mission 
staff are still selected for their technical knowledge and not for their local knowledge, despite 
noted shortcomings of this approach (Autesserre 2010; Gilbert 2012). While prescriptive 
changes to the practice of peacebuilding can be found in donor strategies, EU and UN 
documents, and academia, they still fail to impress peacebuilding practice.  
20 
 
This article cannot (and does not seek to) present a quick and easy solution to help 
international operations find the ‘right’ balance of legitimacy and coercion. However, it does 
present some initial findings on the relations between coercion and legitimacy, the difference 
between initial and action legitimacy, and the need for international operations to find a 
workable balance of powers.  
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